Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee [2021]

594 U.S. ___ (2021) · Supreme Court of the United States · United States

Law of Democracylaw-of-democracyvoting-rights-actsection-2vote-denialdiscriminatory-effects

Issue

Do Arizona's out-of-precinct ballot rule and its ban on third-party ballot collection violate Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act as interpreted in the 1982 amendments?

Held

No. Neither law violates Section 2. The Court held that Section 2's 'results test' for vote denial claims must consider, among other things, the size of the burden imposed, the degree to which the voting rule departs from standard practice, the size of any racial disparity, and the state's justifications for the rule.

Exam use

On an exam, if a fact pattern involves a facially neutral voting law that disproportionately affects minorities (e.g., a voter ID law, limited early voting, or a ballot receipt deadline), apply the Brnovich factors. Do not assume that a disparate impact alone is enough—the state's justification and the size of the burden are dispositive. For partisan gerrymandering, Brnovich is not directly relevant, but for vote denial claims (Section 2, not Section 5), it is now controlling. Compare with the 'Gingles test' for vote dilution.

Summary

The Supreme Court considered whether two Arizona voting laws—an out-of-precinct ballot rule and a ban on ballot collection (so-called 'ballot harvesting')—violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, as amended in 1982. The Court held 6-3 that neither law violated Section 2, establishing a new, more restrictive framework for evaluating vote-denial claims under that statute. The decision narrowed the reach of Section 2 for challenges to facially neutral voting rules with a disproportionate impact on minority voters.

Facts

Arizona enacted two laws: (1) H.B. 2023, which made it a crime to collect and deliver another person's early ballot (offering an exception only for family members, household members, and caregivers), and (2) a long-standing rule that rejected provisional ballots cast by voters outside their assigned precinct. The Democratic National Committee and others sued, arguing that both provisions disproportionately burdened Native American, Hispanic, and African American voters, and violated Section 2's results-based test (disparate impact). The state argued the laws were neutral, non-discriminatory, and designed to prevent fraud and ensure orderly elections.

Procedural History

The district court upheld both laws. The Ninth Circuit reversed, finding both provisions violated Section 2 and, for the ballot-collection ban, also violated the Fifteenth Amendment and the Twenty-Sixth Amendment. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Issue

Do Arizona's out-of-precinct ballot rule and its ban on third-party ballot collection violate Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act as interpreted in the 1982 amendments?

Held

No. Neither law violates Section 2. The Court held that Section 2's 'results test' for vote denial claims must consider, among other things, the size of the burden imposed, the degree to which the voting rule departs from standard practice, the size of any racial disparity, and the state's justifications for the rule.

Ratio Decidendi

A facially neutral voting rule that disproportionately affects minority voters does not violate Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act unless it imposes a 'substantial' and 'material' obstacle to voting. Courts must examine the totality of circumstances, including the simply non-racial justification for the rule, the size of the burden, and the extent of any disparity. Minor disparities in impact are insufficient when the state has a strong, non-discriminatory justification.

Obiter Dicta

Justice Kagan dissented, arguing that the majority imposed a much higher threshold than Congress intended, effectively overruling decades of precedent. She maintained that Section 2 requires an 'effects test' only—a showing that the law results in a disparate impact on a protected group, without regard to the state's justification.

Reasoning

Justice Alito, writing for the majority, interpreted the 1982 amendments to Section 2. The Court held that while Section 2 was designed to be a 'results test,' not requiring proof of discriminatory intent, it does not impose a strict liability standard. Instead, courts must evaluate several non-exhaustive factors: (1) the size of the burden imposed; (2) the extent to which the rule departs from what was standard practice when Section 2 was amended; (3) the size of any racial disparity; (4) the state's interests in the rule; and (5) the availability of alternative means of voting. Applying these factors, the Court found that the out-of-precinct rule was a minor inconvenience, consistent with long-standing practice (since precinct-based voting is common), and that the ban on ballot collection was a reasonable anti-fraud measure with a minimal disparate impact.

Plain-English Explanation

Before this case, some courts and advocates thought that if a voting law had a disproportionate impact on minority voters, it automatically violated Section 2 of the VRA, even if the law was neutral on its face and the state had a good reason for it. The Supreme Court said no—that's too strict. Now, courts must look at how burdensome the law is, how common or unusual it is, how big the racial gap is, and what the state's reason is. A small burden with a small disparity for a good reason is usually fine.

Essay-Ready Explanation Generator

Version 1 of 4

Reference to Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee (594 U.S. ___ (2021)) strengthens a Law of Democracy answer because the case reflects the principle that A facially neutral voting rule that disproportionately affects minority voters does not violate Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act unless it imposes a 'substantial' and 'material' obstacle to voting. Courts must examine the totality of circumstances, including the simply non-racial justification for the rule, the size of the burden, and the extent of any disparity. Minor disparities in impact are insufficient when the state has a strong, non-discriminatory justification. Applied to a problem question, the case should be used after identifying the issue as Do Arizona's out-of-precinct ballot rule and its ban on third-party ballot collection violate Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act as interpreted in the 1982 amendments? The stronger essay move is to connect the material facts to the court's holding, then explain whether the present facts support the same conclusion or justify distinguishing the authority.

Underlying Concepts

  • vote denial
  • disparate impact
  • totality of circumstances
  • results test
  • burden on voting
  • non-discriminatory justification

Precedents Applied

  • Thornburg v. Gingles (1986) — Section 2's test for vote dilution
  • Chisom v. Roemer (1991) — Section 2 applies to at-large elections

Later Treatment

  • Arkansas State Conference NAACP v. Arkansas Board of Apportionment (8th Cir. 2024) — applied Brnovich factors to a redistricting case; different circuits have split on how to weigh the factors

Key Passages

  • The mere fact there is some disparity in impact does not necessarily mean that a system is not equally open or that it does not give everyone an equal opportunity to vote.

Significance

Brnovich is the Supreme Court's most important interpretation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act in the context of vote denial (as opposed to vote dilution). It significantly raised the bar for plaintiffs challenging non-discriminatory voting rules (like voter ID laws, registration restrictions, or polling place changes) under a disparate impact theory. Lower courts now apply the Brnovich factors, which give substantial weight to state justifications and to the availability of alternative voting methods. The decision is crucial for any exam on voting rights post-Shelby County, especially for challenges to laws unrelated to redistricting.

Related Cases

Exam Tips

On an exam, if a fact pattern involves a facially neutral voting law that disproportionately affects minorities (e.g., a voter ID law, limited early voting, or a ballot receipt deadline), apply the Brnovich factors. Do not assume that a disparate impact alone is enough—the state's justification and the size of the burden are dispositive. For partisan gerrymandering, Brnovich is not directly relevant, but for vote denial claims (Section 2, not Section 5), it is now controlling. Compare with the 'Gingles test' for vote dilution.

Revision Checklist

  • Name the issue before discussing facts so the marker sees the legal question immediately.
  • State the holding in one sentence, then use the ratio to explain why the court reached that result.
  • Use the citation and jurisdiction to show why this authority matters for the problem you are answering.
  • Pair this case with one supporting or contrasting authority if the question tests limits, policy, or exceptions.

Problem Question Use

Use Brnovich to argue that a state's voting law (e.g., ID requirement, limited mail voting) is not a violation of Section 2, even if it has a minor disparate impact. Highlight the state's anti-fraud or administrative justifications. For the plaintiff, try to show that the burden is large (e.g., few alternative methods, wide racial gap, no fraud problem) within the Brnovich framework.

Common Pitfalls

  • Applying the Gingles test for vote dilution to a vote denial case—these are different claims with different tests
  • Forgetting that Brnovich did not overrule any part of the VRA; it just interpreted the 'results test' narrowly
  • Assuming that a showing of discriminatory intent is required after Brnovich (it's not—disparate impact still matters, but the threshold is higher).

Sources